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Abstract
This paper analyzes equilibria in sequential take-it-or-leave-it sales when demand is stochas-
tic. It is shown that equilibria in this sales mechanism, unlike in sequential auctions, trade-off
allocative efficiency and competing buyers’ opportunities to acquire an item to be sold, permitting
prices and expected revenue above those of one-shot offers. Hence Coase-type conjectures are
invalid in this setting.
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1 Introduction
This paper builds on three basic observations: (i) Many economic decisions on
markets, such as sellers’ pricing and buyers’ purchase decisions, are dynamic;
(ii) economic agents’ preferences and valuations are private information, and
hence market demand is stochastic; (iii) in many markets, the number of
potential buyers is small. The implications of these conditions are analyzed
for a situation in which a monopolistic seller of one item faces a group of n
potential buyers with unit demands, whose valuations for the item are private
information. There are two periods. If the item does not sell in period 1, it
is common knowledge that it may be offered again in the final period 2. The
paper considers take-it-or-leave-it sales. Potential buyers compete with each
other as it is assumed that the item is randomly assigned among buyers willing
to buy at a given price. The paper examines whether the dynamic nature of
the transaction game and the intrinsic market uncertainty favor one side of
the market, and if so, under what circumstances.
Many markets exhibit the characteristics (i)-(iii), employing take-it-or-
leave-it sales mechanisms, and sometimes auctions, with a possibility of re-
offering the item, should it not be sold in the first offering. The most promi-
nent online trading platform, eBay, next to its traditional auction sales now
offers sellers the option of posted-price sales, under the“Buy It Now” label,
and meanwhile earns a quarter of its revenue from it.1
The analysis presented in this paper shows that the dynamic nature of
potentially sequential offers induces strategic behavior in small markets with
stochastic demand which has surprising consequences: It may allow the take-
it-or-leave-it seller to benefit from a second period, contrary to Coase-type con-
jectures; see Coase (1972), as well as formalizations by Bulow (1982), Stokey
(1981), Gul, Sonnenschein and Wilson (1986), Ausubel and Deneckere (1989),
and The´pot (1998), all under the assumptions of deterministic demand and
complete information. Various studies elucidate conditions, which differ from
the set-up considered in this paper, under which the conjecture fails: Bagnoli
et al. (1989, 1995) show that substituting discrete demands for the assumption
of a continuum of buyers reverses Coase’s conclusion; Ausubel and Deneckere
(1992) demonstrate a no-trade equilibrium if the seller’s marginal cost is pri-
vate information; McAfee and Wiseman (2004) show in a deterministic envi-
ronment that, if the seller can choose production capacity in every period and
buyers get served in order of their valuations, then even small capacity costs
1BusinessWeek online, 27 August 2004. Traditional auction houses also offer private
sales, such as, for instance, Sotheby’s “salon prive´” for jewellery.
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permit the seller to act as if she could commit to capacity at the outset, induc-
ing non-zero profits. This paper differs from these critiques in three essential
ways. First, demand is stochastic, as a consequence of incomplete informa-
tion about potential buyers’ valuations. Second, capacity is understood as the
costless and fixed supply of a single item at the outset, which cannot be repro-
duced in subsequent periods. And, third, there is no assumption that buyers
get served in order of their valuations, i.e. that any allocation is necessarily
efficient. Instead, it is assumed that the item is assigned randomly among
potential those buyers whose equilibrium strategies induce them to accept a
given equilibrium price. Under these assumptions, buyers face the risk of not
being served if the final allocation is inefficient; with positive probability, the
item is not assigned to the highest valuation buyer. In equilibrium under the
take-it-or-leave-it mechanism, the increased risk of not obtaining the item in
the second period, when the equilibrium price is lower, induces high valuation
buyers to accept a higher price in the first period. Competition among buyers
with stochastic demand, thus, alters buyers’ strategic incentives compared to
Coase-type analyses with deterministic demand. This creates a competitive
externality in demand which the seller can exploit in take-it-or-leave-it sales.
Depending on the degree to which second period pay-offs are discounted and
how many potential buyers compete, this competitive externality allows the
take-it-or-leave-it seller to achieve higher expected revenue in the dynamic
(two-period) than the static (one-period) game.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section two presents the model and the
main results. Section 3 briefly compares sequential take-it-or-leave-it mecha-
nisms to sequential auctions, which often serve as alternative mechanisms, as
the eBay and Sotheby examples illustrate.2 Section 4 concludes. All proofs
are in an appendix.
2 Sequential Take-it-or-leave-it Sales
The analysis maintains the following assumptions:
Assumption A1: Buyers’ valuations Xi are independently and identically
distributed with CDF F (x), i = 1, · · · , n.
Assumption A2: F (x) is twice continuously differentiable, with pdf f(x)
which is positive on the support X of F , which is assumed to be a compact
set; w.l.o.g., X = [0, 1].
2Bulow and Klemperer (1996) also compare auctions and negotiations, but assume an
exogenously, continuously delcining prices and efficient allocations. The broader question of
endogenous market regimes is taken up by Haris and Raviv (1981a).
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Assumption A3: Marginal revenue 1−F (x)−xf(x) is downward sloping.3
Assumption A4: The item has zero value for the seller if it is not sold; the
seller maximizes expected revenue, and the buyers maximize expected surplus,
and buyers and the seller are risk-neutral. If several buyers submit purchase
orders at any given price, the item is randomly assigned to any one of them.
It is common knowledge that the item will be re-offered in period two if it is
not sold in period one. Buyers and the seller have common discount factor
δ ∈ [0, 1].
Since buyers’ valuations in the sequential game considered in this paper
are private information, the game is a dynamic game with incomplete infor-
mation. The appropriate equilibrium concept is therefore a Perfect Bayesian
Equilibrium (PBE). In the two period case, it is defined as first and second
period prices and buyers’ strategies to submit purchase orders such that, given
prices, buyers’ strategies maximize their expected surplus, and given buyers’
strategies, the period prices maximize the seller’s expected profit.
In the two period game with δ > 0, some buyers will find it optimal to
wait until the second period, even though their valuation exceeds the first
period price. This is so because in equilibrium the second period price will not
be higher than the first period price. The equilibrium valuation of marginal
buyers just indifferent between buying at either price, denoted by y = y(δ, n),
can be interpreted as a measure of how strategic buyers behave: If it were the
case that y = 0, buyers would submit purchase orders according to their true
valuations, i.e. there would be no strategic delays. If, on the other hand, it
were the case that y = 1, all buyers would out-wait the seller; this PBE, if it
exists, would be reminiscent of the so-called Coase conjecture. The following
results shows that, with stochastic demand, neither one of these two polar
cases is a PBE.
Theorem 1: Consider a two period game with consecutive take-it-or-leave-
it sales. Under assumptions A1-A4, there exists a unique PBE with first and
second period prices p1(y
) ≥ p2(y), which are monotonic in y, and where y
is in the interior of X .
The result is proven in the appendix and has the following corollary.
Corollary 1: Under assumptions A1-A4, (i) there exists δˇ ∈ (0, 1) such
that, for all δ ∈ [δˇ, 1], a take-it-or-leave-it seller achieves higher expected rev-
enue in a two period game than in a one period game, and (ii) the equilibrium
first period price p1(y
) > p = argmaxp p(1−F (p)n), where p is the optimal
3In auction theory, assumption A3 is sometimes referred to as regularity in the sense of
Myerson (1981). See, e.g., Klemperer (2000)
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Figure 1: Sequential Sales with Independent Uniform Valuations, n = 2.
price in a one-shot offering.
In other words, with stochastic demand a sufficiently patient take-it-or-
leave-it seller always benefits from the sales opportunities provided by future
periods. Enhanced competition among buyers if the item is not sold in period
one induces a competitive externality in demand. This externality allows the
seller to charge a first period price that would be higher than optimal in a
simple one-shot take-it-or-leave-it offering.
As an example, consider the case of two potential buyers, n = 2, whose
valuations are Xi ∼ i.i.d. u[0, 1], i = 1, 2. Figure 1 shows the seller’s expected
revenue and the buyers’ strategic threshold y as a function of the discount
factor δ.
3 Comparison with Sequential Auctions
With incomplete information about buyers’ valuations, auctions are often an-
other attractive sales mechanism. Compared with take-it-or-leave-it sales, the
required coordination to set up an auction often makes them more costly, how-
ever. On the other hand, in a setting with symmetric and risk neutral buyers
with independent private values and downward sloping marginal revenues, i.e.
4
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under assumptions A1-A4, it is well known that an auction with an optimal
reserve price is the optimal mechanism (Vickery (1961), Myerson (1981), Riley
and Samuelson (1981), Harris and Raviv (1981)). Hence, there exist sequen-
tial auction formats which dominate the take-it-or-leave-it sales mechanism
uniformly for any discount factor, but these may be costly to implement.4
The analysis considers sequential first-price sealed bid auctions. This facil-
itates comparison with sequential take-it-or-leave-it sales because equilibrium
bidding strategies involve bid shading, which is reminiscent of the strategic
delays identified in the preceding section. By the classical revenue equivalence
theorem (Vickerey (1961), Myerson (1981), Riley and Samuelson (1981), Mil-
grom and Weber (1982)) different auction designs induce the same implications
regarding expected revenue. In the case of sequential auctions, a PBE involves
reserve prices in both periods as well as bidding strategies, such that, given
bidders’ strategies, the reserve prices maximize the auction seller’s expected
revenue, and given the reserve prices, the bidding strategies maximize the bid-
ders’ expected surpluses. As in the case of sequential take-it-or-leave-it sales,
there exists an equilibrium threshold valuation y so that only bidders with
valuations above this threshold in the period one auction submit equilibrium
bids above the period one equilibrium reserve price. The PBE in such auctions
is characterized by
Theorem 2: Consider a two period game with consecutive first-price sealed
bid auctions. Under assumptions A1-A4, there exists a unqiue PBE with first
and second period reserve prices R1(y
) and R2(y
) which are monotonic in
y; furthermore, y = y(δ) is monotonically increasing in δ, and y(1) = 1.
Note that this implies that, when the future is not discounted, the auction
seller effectively collapses the game into a single auction in the second period,
by setting a prohibitively high reserve price in the first auction. This result
has an important corollary.
Corollary 2: Under assumptions A1-A4, the expected revenue of a two
period game with consecutive first-price sealed bid auctions is no larger than
the expected revenue of a single auction in the first period.
Hence, in the setting considered in this paper, auction sellers, unlike take-
it-or-leave-it sellers, never benefit from a second period.
Continuing with the example of the preceding section, with two potential
4Optimal sequential auctions are also considered by McAfee and Vincent (1997), for the
case of sequential second-price sealed-bid auction designs, and Laffont and Robert (2000),
for sequential first-price auctions in the case of affiliated values.
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Figure 2: Sequential First-Price Sealed Bid Auctions with Independent Uni-
form Valuations, n = 2.
buyers with independent and uniformly distributed valuations, Figure 2 shows
the auction seller’s expected revenue and the buyers’ strategic threshold y as
a function of the discount factor δ.
4 Conclusions
This paper emphasizes the strategic implications of market uncertainty for
equilibria in dynamic markets. It highlights the trade-off in take-it-or-leave-it
sales between allocative efficiency and opportunities for buyers other than the
highest valuation buyer to obtain an item to be sold; this trade-off induces a
competitive externality in demand, due to competing buyers who are willing to
pay for this opportunity. And it concludes that there exist dynamic situations
in which a take-it-or-leave-it seller can inter-temporally exploit this trade-off
to raise prices and expected revenue above the one obtained in a one-shot
take-it-or-leave-it offer. This cannot happen in sequential auctions in which
the allocation is guaranteed to be efficient. The analysis demonstrates that
market uncertainty may invalidate Coase-type conjectures.
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A Appendix
A.1 Proof of Theorem 1 and Corollary 1
A.1.1 Theorem1
Proceed by backward induction. Given valuation y of the marginal buyer, in
period two the seller’s problem is
max
p2
p2
(
1−
(
F (p2)
F (y)
)n)
,
so that p2 = p2(y) solves
F (y)n − F (p2)n − p2nF (p2)n−1f(p2) = 0.
Regularity A3 implies that the solution is unique, given y. Also, notice that
increasing y shifts up the left-hand side of the last expression, so that A3
implies that p2 must rise to return to equality. Hence, p2(y) is monotonically
increasing in y.
Given y, the first period price p1(y) is such that the marginal buyer with
valuation y is indifferent between buying in either period, hence, her expected
surplus E[s(y, δ)] is
E[s(y, δ)] = (y − p1(y))
⎡
⎣n−1∑
i=0
(
n−1
i
)
i + 1
(1− F (y))iF (y)n−1−i
⎤
⎦
= δ(y − p2(y))
⎡
⎣n−1∑
i=0
(
n−1
i
)
i + 1
(F (y)− F (p2(y)))iF (p2(y))n−1−i
⎤
⎦ ,
where the second term in square brackets results from the product of the
probability of the game progressing to the second period, F (y)n−1, and the
conditional probability of obtaining the item, given that competing buyers’
valuations are below y, i.e.
∑n−1
i=0
(n−1i )
i+1
(
1− F (p2(y))
F (y)
)i (F (p2(y))
F (y)
)n−1−i
. The
seller will choose choose prices that induce y = y(δ, n) such as to equate
expected marginal revenue from selling in periods one and two. Expected
revenue in either period is the product of period price and probability of sale.
Since an increase in y implies that the probability of selling in period two rises
while the probability of selling in period one falls, and since p2(y) is increasing
in y, p1(y) must be monotonically increasing in y. Moreover, p1(y) > p2(y)
for all y because otherwise, by continuity, a buyer i with valuation Xi just
7
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below y could obtain higher expected surplus by submitting a purchase order
in period one: In this case, i’s surplus is higher, conditional on being assigned
the item, accrues earlier and with higher probability, since in that case Pr(y <
Xj =i < p1(y)) < Pr(Xj =i < p2(y)).
Finally, suppose y were not unique, i.e. ∃ y1 < y2, both equating expected
marginal revenues and yielding the same expected revenue. Then, for any n
and δ,
p1(y

j ) ≥ p2(yj ), j = 1, 2
and
Pr(max{Xi, i = 1, . . . , n} > y1) > Pr(max{Xi, i = 1, . . . , n} > y2)
Pr(max{Xi, i = 1, . . . , n} ∈ S1) < Pr(max{Xi, i = 1, . . . , n} ∈ S2),
where S1 = [p2(y

1), y

1] and S2 = [p2(y

2), y

2]. Since by hypothesis expected
revenue is equal for y1 and y

2, it must be that
p1(y

2) > p1(y

1)
p2(y

2) < p2(y

1),
a contradiction to the monotonicity of p2(y). Hence y
 = y(δ, n) is unique.
If δ = 0, then y is irrelevant.5 Consider δ ∈ (0, 1] and suppose y = 1.
Then, p1(1) = 1 and p2(1) < 1. Therefore, the expected surplus of the marginal
buyer, whose valuation is y = 1, is zero in period one, and positive in period
two. Hence, y = 1 cannot be part of a PBE. Alternatively, suppose y = 0.
Then, p2(0) = 0 and p1(0) > 0. In this case, the expected surplus of the
marginal bidder is zero in period two and negative in period one. Hence y = 0
cannot be part of a PBE. Therefore, y must be in the interior of X . This
completes the proof of the theorem. 
A.1.2 Proof of Corollary 1
The corollary follows immediately. Part (i) is implied by y in the interior of
X : In any PBE, since y < sup{x : x ∈ X}, the seller never finds it optimal
to choose a prohibitively high first-period price which would induce all buyers
to wait for the second period. Hence collapsing the dynamic game to a one-
shot game, which is only possible by annihilating the first period subgame, is
not optimal. Since Theorem 1 for δ = 1 then implies that expected revenue
is higher in the one-shot game, by continuity of expected revenue in δ, there
5In this case, the game collapses to a one-shot game. Haris and Raviv (1981) provide a
theory for optimal endogenous pricing regimes in such games.
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exists δˇ ∈ (0, 1) such that expected revenues for the sequential game are higher
for all δ ∈ [δˇ, 1]. Part (ii) follows from y > 0 in any PBE: In a one shot game,
the seller faces all buyers and hence the price p targets all buyers; in the first
period of the dynamic game, the seller only faces high valuation buyers with
valuations above y > 0, and hence the first period price p1(y
) > p, targeting
only these buyers. 
A.2 Proof of Theorem 2 and Corollary 2
A.2.1 Theorem 2
The game is solved by backward induction. Bidder i’s bidding function in the
second auction is
b(Xi, R2, n) = Xi −
∫ Xi
R2
F (u)n−1du/F (Xi)n−1.
Bidder i’s expected surplus in this auction, conditional on it taking place, is
s2(Xi, R2, n) =
∫Xi
R2
F (u)n−1du/F (y)n−1, while the seller’s expected revenue is
π2(y,R2, n) = E
[
X −
∫ X
R2
F (u)n−1du/F (X)n−1;X ∈ [R2, y]
]
,
where the expectation is taken with respect to the distribution of the maximum
of the Xi, i.e. nF (x)
n−1f(x)dx. The seller chooses R2 so as to maximize this
expected revenue, so R2 = R2(y, n) solves
n
[
F (R2)
n−1(F (y)− F (R2))−R2f(R2)F (R2)n−1
]
= 0
⇔ F (y)− F (R2)−R2f(R2) = 0.
This implies the well-known result that R2 ≡ R2(y) does not (directly) depend
on n. It does depend on n indirectly, through the dependence of the equilib-
rium y on n. By A3, the solution exists and is unique. The last equality
implies that y > R2(y), as a consequence of A2. Also, since raising y shifts
up the left-hand side, to return to equality R2 has to rise, so that R2(y) is
monotonically increasing in y.
Since the marginal bidder’s discounted expected surplus in the second auc-
tion is
δs2(y,R2(y), n)F (y)
n−1 = δ
∫ y
R2(y)
F (u)n−1du > 0,
the bidding function β for the first auction is shaded taking this amount into
consideration, beyond conventional shading, so that
β(X, y, n, δ) = X −
∫X
y F (u)
n−1du
F (X)n−1
− δ
∫ y
R2(y)
F (u)n−1du
F (X)n−1
.
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The reserve price of the first auction equals the bid of the marginal bidder.
Hence,
R1(y, n, δ) = β(y, y, n, δ) = y − δ
∫ y
R2(y)
F (u)n−1du
F (y)n−1
.
Also,
d
dy
R1(y, n, δ) = 1− δ + δ
(
F (R2(y))
F (y)
)n−1
d
dy
R2(y) + (n− 1)
∫ y
R2(y)
F (u)n−1du
F (y)n−2
,
i.e. d
dy
R1(y, n, δ) > 0 and R1(y) ≡ R1(y, n, δ) is seen to be monotonically
increasing in y, since R2(y) is. Since y(δ) ≥ R1(δ) for any δ and R1(δ) is
monotonically increasing in δ, it follows that y = y(δ) is increasing in δ as
well.
It remains to be shown that y = 1 can be part of a PBE. To demonstrate
this, consider δ = 1 and compare the seller’s and buyers’ strategies for y = 1
and y = 1− , for some  > 0. In the latter case, it follows from the previous
arguments that both reserve prices will be lower than in the former. Because
bids are monotonic in valuations, the highest valuation buyer is guaranteed
to win the item in either case, but is better off in the latter because his bid
can be lower and, therefore, his expected return higher, than in the former
and there is no time cost when δ = 1. But this is to the disadvantage of the
seller, who, therefore, will choose the higher reserve prices prevailing when
y = 1. The situation is different when δ < 1 because then buyers with very
high valuations will prefer avoiding the cost from waiting instead of a higher
expected return accruing in the second period. Hence, when δ = 1, y = 1 is
part of a PBE. 
A.2.2 Corollary 2
In the auction mechanism, the bidder with the highest valuation is guaranteed
to win the item, because bidding functions are strictly increasing in valuations.
Hence, the expected revenue of the game equals the discounted expected value
of the winning bid. In a single auction, in the case δ = 0, there is no strategic
delay on the part of the bidders, and so the expected auction revenue is π =
E[max{β(Xi, R1(0), n, 0), i = 1, · · · , n}] = E[max{Xi, i = 1, · · · , n}]. With
δ > 0, monotonicity of y(δ) implies that some bidders strategically delay
submitting eligible bids, i.e. bids above the first period reserve price R1(δ),
so that the bidding function for the first period auction is decreasing in δ,
and it exceeds the bidding function for the second period auction. Hence, the
expected winning bid cannot exceed π. When δ = 1, then y = y(1) = 1, so no
10
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bidder submits a bid above R1(1) in the first period, and the game collapses
to a single auction in the second period, which yields expected revenue equal
to π.6 
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